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Making Progress in Marketing Research 
 
Abstract 
 
Progress in any subject requires the origination of theoretical ideas. Often, new theoretical ideas 
are derived from unpredicted findings. Some methods, such as surveys, yield more unpredicted 
findings compared to experiments and too great an emphasis on testing theories by experiment 
may therefore lead to fewer new ideas. We argue that researchers in marketing and other social 
sciences should give more consideration to methods that produce large amounts of evidence; by 
doing so, they may speed up the development of their subject.  
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How does marketing research progress? 
In the social sciences, much attention has been given to the status of theories and how these 
theories should be tested (e.g., Kuhn, 1962; Popper, 1980; Wilkinson, 2012; Kenworthy and 
Yadav 2010, Sparks, 2016). Rather less attention is directed to the genesis of these theories.  
How do new ideas come into the minds of researchers in the first place? What helps or hinders 
this creative thinking? Let us start by admitting that much scientific activity is not that creative. 
Many of our findings rest on the application of established thinking but, occasionally, we get 
evidence that raises questions about widely held beliefs and practices or suggests an answer to a 
persisting problem. Such findings may redirect our work and we need to foster the circumstances 
that create this sort of outcome.  
 
What will assist the production of new theoretical ideas? One way of exploring the origin of 
these ideas is to look at the scientists themselves: what drives these researchers? How do they 
conduct themselves? This has been done by Sternberg, Fiske and Foss (2016) but their account 
tends to focus on the individual traits of the behavioural scientists they studied and these are not 
easily modified or emulated, which limits the change that is possible via this route. Another 
approach could focus on the social aspect. Research is usually conducted collaboratively with 
fellow researchers. Thus, if we ask how new thinking came about, the answer often relates to 
interactions with others within the social setting in which science is performed. The multiple 
authorship of many papers suggests that new ideas prosper in an interactive context but we also 
note that some of the greatest contributors to science acted individually (e.g. Newton, Darwin 
and Einstein), so this matter is not clear cut. We can also look at the established practices 
governing science – how can the reviewing process be improved, for example? Reviewers are 
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often strongest on the methodological aspects of research and may not understand the new ideas 
or attach enough importance to them when they do understand. In contrast to such approaches, 
our focus is quite narrow. After a discussion of what is involved in idea generation, and noting 
that new ideas are often generated by new data, we look at the data yield provided by two 
different methods: experiments and surveys. We argue that we should invest more effort in 
methods that produce large amounts of data because it is here that new findings may emerge that 
require a new explanation. We suggest that survey work is undervalued as a source of new ideas 
in social science.  
 
Testing new ideas 
In marketing, many factors may operate at the same time to produce outcomes; in this respect, it 
belongs with other social sciences, and subjects such as biology, medical research and 
environmental sciences.  This means that an explanation for an effect may be partial and 
prediction uncertain. In contrast, there are cases in the physical sciences where new theories are 
dramatically confirmed by classic experiments and observations. For example, in physics, 
Einstein predicted how much light would bend as it passed through the gravitational field of the 
Sun. His calculations of the deflection angle from a straight-line path were verified in an 
observational study of the solar eclipse in May 1919 (Kennefick, 2009). More recently, the 
gravitational waves predicted by Einstein’s general theory of relativity were detected on 
September 14, 2015 in two large-scale experimental physics observatories in Washington State 
and Louisiana, U.S.A. This was hailed as a triumphant confirmation of Einstein’s theory 
(Conover, 2016).  
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In the social sciences, such crucial tests are hard to find. Because many factors may be at work to 
produce an outcome, the effect of one factor may be small. Sometimes, there is no theory to test; 
instead we have a problem to solve or are simply curious, and for some practical purposes we 
may be content to establish facts such as the relative purchasing power of different population 
segments. But in marketing research, we look for explanations. For example, why does the long-
term effect of advertising relate to the short-term effect? Why are certain factors associated with 
the impact of recommendation? Sometimes these explanations rest on simple relationships; at 
other times, they may be cast as a formal theory. So, we have findings, their possible 
explanations, the testing of these (competing) explanations and subsequent evaluation which may 
give rise to more ideas and tests. In this rolling process, the generation of new ideas is essential.  
 
Forming new ideas 
Two types of new idea can be identified. First, we have insights that allow us to reframe our 
thinking in a new way. Such insights may arise from a single odd finding, strange association, or 
contrary result which does not fit existing thinking. Second, and perhaps more commonly, we 
recognise that an already established solution can be applied to a problem. In practice, it may be 
hard to say whether a new idea is a case of insight or recognition since some applications of 
existing thinking involve considerable imagination. These processes, insight and recognition, are 
the means whereby we identify research questions, make sense of unfamiliar findings and 
sometimes see new ways of investigating a problem. Nisbett and Wilson (1977) have pointed out 
that the mental mechanisms giving rise to insights are not directly accessible: we know that we 
have had a new idea but are not conscious of how we came to think it. This means that we must 
study such processes indirectly, by looking at the circumstances associated with them.  
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Of the two processes, insights particularly interest us because these seem most likely to redirect 
research in a major way. In the physical sciences, the insights of intellectual giants such as 
Newton, Darwin, Einstein, Lavoisier and Maxwell opened new fields of inquiry and changed the 
conduct of their discipline. How do insights emerge? Wallas (1926) proposed a four-fold model 
of the creative process: preparation, incubation, illumination and verification. We are doubtful 
about this neat order of phases and suspect that illumination (insight, recognition) is more 
distributed but preparation in Wallas’ classification does suggest that there is often a period of 
assembling and reviewing the available evidence. To ground this discussion, we review cases 
where major advances in our understanding of marketing and psychology have been made, and 
consider how such breakthroughs came about. If we can show how our subject advances in 
practice, we may be able to stimulate such advance by focusing on methods that are associated 
with progress. To reflect the irregular pattern of new understanding, we include one case 
(relationship marketing) where the initial advance has been somewhat checked by contrary 
findings.   
 
Examples 
Stationary markets 
One well-established field has been the modelling of near-stationary markets. Most markets are 
close to stationary and researchers led by Ehrenberg and Goodhardt (Ehrenberg 1988) have 
shown that individual household purchasing has a near-Poisson pattern while the distribution of 
average household purchasing is close to a gamma distribution (with many light buying 
households and few that are heavy buying). Combining these distributions, they showed that 
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aggregated brand purchase was closely predicted by a negative binomial distribution (NBD). 
This work was extended to all the brands in a category where a Dirichlet distribution was shown 
to fit. This research started when Andrew Ehrenberg was working in market research and a 
brand, Cadbury’s Drinking Chocolate, seemed to have an unusually high purchase level 
(Ehrenberg, undated). One idea was that the brand had an excess of heavy buyers. To explore 
this, attempts were made to model the buying distribution, with the NBD fitting very neatly and 
showing that there was no excess of heavy buyers.  
 
In this case, insight did not reveal the solution. The NBD was the second distribution tested by 
Ehrenberg; thus, the approach was by trial and error, though by someone who already knew what 
might work which attests to the importance of the preparation stage in Wallas’ model discussed 
earlier.  The fit of the NBD was repeated for other brands and Ehrenberg realised that he had 
found a pattern with wide application. Reading Ehrenberg’s (undated) account of the research in 
this field, it seems that some original thinking was involved. The most prominent was the 
extension of the work from the brand to the category (Goodhardt, Ehrenberg and Chatfield, 
1984). Ehrenberg (undated) credits his colleagues Chatfield and Goodhardt with the insight that 
the Dirichlet distribution would model category-level data. 
 
Goodhardt (personal communication) reports two cases of startling findings that forced a 
reassessment of existing assumptions in this field. The first occurred when he studied TV 
programmes that were split into two halves and aired at different times. He found that many 
viewers of the first half failed to see the second half and that their place was taken by others who 
had not seen the first half. It appeared that the viewing of split programmes had a substantial 
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random component and was thus stochastic to a much greater extent than he had anticipated.  In 
the second case, Goodhardt described the purchase patterns observed in adhesive dressings (e.g., 
Elastoplast, BandAid). The researchers were interested in measuring the effect of a forthcoming 
ad campaign and, to induce new purchase in their population sample over the period of the 
campaign, they bought the adhesive dressings from those that had them (about 60% of the 
sample). After the advertising campaign, these people were checked to determine their rate of 
repurchase. To the surprise of the investigators, only about 20% had restocked. They also 
investigated the 40% who had not previously had a stock of adhesive dressings and found that 
here too, about 20% had purchased in the interval. These findings led the researchers to a new 
way of thinking about this market: all households were users but a proportion were out of stock 
at any one time. Again, there was a strongly stochastic aspect to purchase. 
  
Heuristic mechanisms 
A second example of scientific advance comes from psychology. This is the research on heuristic 
thinking accumulated by Kahneman, Slovik and Tversky (1981) and their many followers. This 
work, summarised by Kahneman (2012), has focused on the automatic processes in thinking that 
often displace more rational analysis. There have been some modifications to the interpretation 
of evidence in this field but the idea of heuristic thinking and the specific mechanisms involved 
are now generally supported. Prospect theory, dealing with how decisions are made, was a later 
development of this work (Tversky and Kahneman 1992). Kahneman’s (2012) account of how 
the research evolved indicated that there was an extensive period of discussion and speculation 
between him and Tversky which resulted in many “what if” scenarios, simple experimental trials 
and the eventual assembly of a corpus of findings, many of which were contrary to assumptions 
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made by those who assumed that thinking proceeded in a rational manner. For example, the 
availability heuristic leads people to think that things they can readily recall are more likely. This 
induces bias when relatively rare but dramatic events are easily recalled; an example is the 
number of road deaths, which people tend to overestimate in countries with low road mortality, 
such as the UK, where the annual death toll on the roads is only about 1,800. From Kahneman’s 
account of this work, it appears that the findings were not always anticipated and much of the 
work was driven by curiosity rather than by a clear idea of what might be expected.  
 
Relationship marketing 
A third example is relationship marketing (e.g. Berry 1983, Grönroos 1983, Reichheld and Teal 
1996). Relationship marketers have claimed that established customers are better value than new 
customers because they buy more, recommend the brand more and cost less to service. However, 
as more evidence has accumulated, some of these claimed advantages of established customers 
have lost support. East et al. (2006) found that, on average, long-term customers did not 
recommend more and Reinartz and Kumar (2000) found that these people were not always 
cheaper to service. Other researchers (Sharp 2010, Romaniuk and Sharp 2016) have argued that 
the related matter of brand expansion is best achieved by customer acquisition, citing new 
evidence (Riebe et al 2014). Relationship marketing may be the best policy in certain categories 
but its advantages seem overstated. 
 
Massing the evidence 
In these three cases, two facts stand out. First, a mass of evidence is important. It was the 
accumulation of evidence against some of the claims made in relationship marketing that cast 
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doubt on a long-held principle; and it was also the mass of consistent evidence that led to 
generalisations about heuristic decision making and purchase patterns in stationary markets. 
Often, replications contribute to this mass of evidence when researchers conduct the same study 
on a different population or context. Second, the theory-first approach that applies to some 
developments in the physical science, does not seem to be necessary in social science – if the 
examples selected are typical.  
Sometimes a theory is tested but, often, this theory is sketchy. At other times, research is 
designed to answer practical questions or is conducted out of simple curiosity. In the case of 
relationship marketing, it is questionable whether this field ever gave rise to a theory (as opposed 
to a working principle) and in the case of stationary market theory, the theory came second, after 
data had been gathered. Regarding heuristic decision making, it looks to us from Kahneman’s 
(2012) review that, initially, the researchers lacked a well-formed theory about what they would 
find and that the insights came after the evidence. Patterns of this sort have led to an emphasis on 
an evidence-first approach by some leaders in marketing research. This position was developed 
by Ehrenberg (1993, 1995) and Bass (1995); they claim that scientific advance in marketing 
comes about mainly by the gathering of evidence from which empirical generalisations are 
made; then, more abstract explanations or theories may follow.   
Empirical generalisations 
The most famous of the empirical generalisations coming from Ehrenberg’s work is Double 
Jeopardy. In its positive form, this is that large brands have both greater penetrations and greater 
purchase frequencies – more people buy them and these people buy them more often – and that, 
of the two, penetration varies most over normal purchase intervals. In consequence, a change in 
market share comes about more by change in penetration than by change in purchase frequency. 
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Based on such evidence, marketers are advised to focus on raising penetration by acquiring more 
new customers when they are trying to enlarge a brand’s share (Sharp 2010).  
However, we are cautious about the value of empirical generalisations. In the case of stationary 
market research, empirical generalisations summarise the findings but, here, the logic of 
statistical reasoning controls much of what is found. It is possible to derive a closed-form 
equation linking purchase frequency and penetration – these variables are not accidentally 
related. This means that exceptions to the Double Jeopardy pattern occur only when 
circumstances overpower the normal statistical relationship between penetration and frequency, 
and they rarely do so. A similar case is the multiplier effect in economics. When additional 
money is injected into the economy, it allows people to spend more, which benefits others who 
will, in turn, use their gains to spend more, and so on; this successive spending usually boosts 
economic activity. This feedback process may still fail when a whole population becomes 
exceptionally cautious but the pressure of money circulation is strong. Such logical/statistical 
principles are an important part of many theories. When these are dominant, they may produce 
empirical generalisations, though it is their logical basis that ensures the scope of the 
generalisation. 
Generalisation and explanation 
We normally seek explanation for a pattern of findings, even when the pattern cannot be 
summarised by a generalisation. Consider, for example, the research on the impact of positive 
and negative word of mouth (PWOM, NWOM) on the intention to buy a brand which was 
gathered by East, Hammond and Lomax (2008). Research on 19 categories showed that PWOM 
had more impact than NWOM – on average. Thus, a generalisation from this evidence is that 
PWOM has a stronger effect than NWOM on intention to purchase but this is not particularly 
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useful since some categories showed that NWOM had more impact. Rossiter (2001, p18) points 
out “empirical generalizations, which are the more general type of data, are just averages.” He 
goes on to argue that practically useful principles come from understanding the reasons for 
deviations from these averages. East, Hammond and Lomax searched for reasons why PWOM 
had more impact than NWOM in some categories and less in others. A regression analysis of the 
factors associated with change in intention to purchase showed that the strongest determinant 
was the probability of purchase before receiving word of mouth. PWOM has more effect when 
prior purchase probability is low and there is more scope for an increase in purchase. NWOM, on 
the other hand, has more effect when prior probability is high and there is more scope for a 
reduction. East et al found that when the prior probability of purchase was 0.5, PWOM and 
NWOM had similar impact magnitudes. Thus, much of the greater effect of PWOM could be 
traced to the fact that most prior probabilities were below 0.5. Here, the mass of data allowed the 
researchers to find an explanation for the uneven findings across categories but average effects 
were unilluminating.  
The limitation of empirical generalisation is also illustrated by East et al. (2005), who examined 
Reichheld and Teal’s (1996) claim that long-term customers recommend the brand more. They 
established correlations between customer tenure and claimed volume of recommendations in 23 
services. The correlations ranged from four significant positive associations to four significant 
negative ones, with 15 insignificant relationships. The average correlation was –0.01, which does 
not support Reichheld and Teal’s claim. East et al. confirmed a negative finding for credit card 
service and a positive finding for car servicing by conducting replication studies on these 
categories, so these results are unlikely to be chance events. The mass of data collected allows 
the results to be interpreted. The researchers did not measure the factors associated with 
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recommendation but it seems likely that interest in unchanging products such as credit cards and 
insurance tends to be lost quite rapidly and therefore the inclination to talk about them. Positive 
correlations may occur when the product is regularly refreshed, interest is rekindled, and there is 
something new to talk about (e.g. fashion stores) or when it takes a long time to know whether 
the service is any good (car servicing). Thus, more than one explanation may apply, as is 
common in social science. The data help us to formulate possible explanations but, as before, 
relying on average effects is unhelpful.   
Research on insight 
Insight is a sudden realisation that a problem can be solved or a task accomplished by the 
application of one or more new ideas. Klein (2013) has studied this by gathering examples where 
insight was involved in naturally occurring activity. He is critical of experimental research in this 
field which focuses on impasse problems in tightly specified circumstances. (In an impasse 
problem, the insight required is that a previously used assumption is no longer helpful and that 
alternatives must be examined.) Klein pointed out that insights may arise in other ways and 
found that naturally occurring insights were stimulated under five novel conditions: connections, 
coincidences, curiosities, contradictions, and creative desperation. Of these, connections were 
involved in 82% of his 120 examples of insight (sometimes more than one condition was 
involved). Klein cited Darwin’s development of the theory of natural selection as a case where 
connections were made. Another might be the fit between the littorals of America and Africa 
which suggested the theory of continental drift to Wegener (1912). Klein suggests that people 
have more insights if they are exposed to a large amount of data which may stimulate new 
connections and produce coincidences, curiosities and contradictions. Therefore, we need 
methods that supply plenty of findings.  
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Resistance to new ideas 
Klein is also interested in the circumstances that prevent insights from being accepted. He 
suggested that progress from insights may be stymied when critics have flawed beliefs, lack 
relevant experience, have a passive stance or use overly concrete reasoning (seeking closure and 
avoiding new ideas). In 30 of his cases, the insight of one party was held back by others and it 
was often flawed beliefs that prevented recognition of the insight. In addition, a passive stance 
was found in 21 cases out of these 30 cases. Klein found that in two thirds of his 120 cases, 
experience was a necessary precursor to insight (to be insightful, a person needs a prepared 
mind). In many situations, we focus on eliminating error and this may result in new ideas 
receiving short shrift. This is certainly true of scientific research where there are many examples 
of new ideas being delayed by the scientific establishment. Relating to flawed beliefs, a major 
barrier to the acceptance of a new theory occurs when it is contrary to pre-existing theories, a 
version of status quo bias. Darwin’s thinking was contrary to ideas of divine creation; Wegener’s 
theory, which took decades to become accepted, was contrary to the pre-established idea that 
contours on the earth’s surface were produced by cooling; Lavoisier’s contemporaries were 
reluctant to abandon phlogiston theory, despite Lavoisier’s contrary evidence.  
 
One example quoted by Klein was the Australian doctor, Barry Marshall, who took ten years to 
get his evidence published on the role of helicobacter pylori in the causation of stomach ulcers. 
Marshall had initially been struck by two coincidences: one of his patients, who had a bacterial 
infection in the stomach, also had chronic stomach pain; another patient treated with antibiotics 
recovered from stomach pain. In his research, Marshall eventually showed that 13 patients with 
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stomach ulcers all had helicobacter pylori. Despite illustrating the process by deliberately 
infecting himself, his papers implicating helicobacter in stomach ulcers were rejected. 
Eventually, he moved to the USA, where his self-experiment created interest and public agencies 
took note. This example shows the hold pre-existing ideas have on the scientific community; it 
was thought that bacteria could not survive in the acidic environment of the stomach and there 
was a standard practice of treating stomach pain with antacids or surgery. This suggests that 
some new ideas may fail to make it or be long delayed because of the resistance encountered 
from the scientific community. Bryson (2003) documents many cases where new ideas 
languished for long periods before eventual acceptance. Klein claims that, often, persistence pays 
off but his method cannot demonstrate this because the cases where persistence did not pay off 
would not have made it to his sample. The power of status quo bias suggests that we should take 
this into account and give extra support to new ideas that challenge existing thinking. 
 
Klein’s method, using an ad hoc collection of examples, does not tell us how frequently insight is 
the key to new scientific advances. In some fields, there may be a range of potential solutions to 
a problem and advance comes about from working through the possible solutions rather than 
from “seeing” a new solution. This was partly the case in the development of knowledge on 
stationary markets and we suspect that this is often the case when an invention is developed. For 
example, there appears to have been little insight behind the development in agriculture of new 
varieties of cereal. When Norman Borlang began work on improving cereals in Mexico, 
dwarfing (to avoid wind damage), yield, nutritional value, drought tolerance and disease 
resistance were all seen as desirable outcomes in cereal breeding. In time, this programme bore 
fruit and in 1963 the Mexican wheat crop was six times larger than in 1944 and the new varieties 
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were grown throughout the world. Borlang was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize in 1970 and an 
assessment of his work indicated that it saved a billion people from starvation. However, when 
reading the account of this remarkable research programme, only one insight was noticeable; this 
was when Borlang realised that he could speed up the development of new cereal varieties in 
Mexico by growing the cereal twice each year.  
 
Two methods of investigation compared 
If insights are important, we next ask if some methods are better than others in generating such 
insights because they produce more evidence than others. Below, we restrict ourselves to the 
comparison of the two most established methods of research, experiments and surveys.   
Experiments 
In the physical sciences, researchers may draw hypotheses from theory and then conduct a 
crucial experiment that tests these hypotheses. This is possible when the theory has been 
specified and factors of interest can be isolated so that other interpretations of findings are 
excluded. However, in the social sciences, there are many variables, populations and settings and 
multiple causes are at work (Campbell and Stanley 1963). By using controls, it is possible to 
gather findings for one set of conditions but a finding for one category, segment and context may 
not apply to other categories, segments or contexts so that many studies may be required to show 
any coherent pattern in the findings. This makes the generalisability of laboratory findings 
necessarily limited as has been discussed by East (2016); it is also one explanation why the 
attempts to replicate work in psychology and marketing are often unsuccessful (Open Science 
Collaboration, 2015, Hubbard and Armstrong 1994, Evanschitzky et al, 2007).  
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Field experiments are better than lab experiments to the extent that they can cover the broad 
range of conditions that will usually apply when findings are applied. Thus, a field experiment 
comparing two ads gives a degree of confidence about the ads’ relative effectiveness when they 
are aired but, even here, there are doubts because other variables may interact with the ads on 
test; for example, news stories may affect a test ad in a manner that is not likely to apply when 
the ad is aired later. Fifty-five field experiments were used to investigate long-term ad effect by 
Lodish et al. (1995). The researchers compared the extra sales in the test year (when the ads were 
aired) with the extra sales in the two years following. On average, the extra sales in the two later 
years were about the same as those in the test year, although only half of the brands that they 
studied showed a long-term effect. In this case, the empirical generalisation is useful. It means 
that, on average, an investment in advertising can pay back twice as much as people thought, 
based on a one-year evaluation. However, Lodish et al.’s evidence still requires a more detailed 
explanation: one likely contender is that the brand advertising was poor in many cases and, 
supporting this, Lodish et al. found that a long-term effect does not occur when there is no short-
term response to the advertising; a second possible explanation for no long-term effect is that 
sales effects are often cancelled out by competitive advertising.  
 
One feature of the experimental test of hypotheses is that a finding that is predicted is a stronger 
result than one that is observed but not predicted. A happenstance finding may be one of many 
possible findings and may be “significant” because of chance whereas, if only one result is 
predicted, the significance level can be accepted at face value. This matter is well recognised and 
researchers normally test serendipitous findings further before acceptance. Because of their 
dubious significance, some serendipitous findings may be ignored but these findings are an 
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important basis for new ideas, a feedstock for insight or recognition that may lead to new 
thinking in the subject. This is true of the physical sciences as well, as witnessed in the 
accidental discovery of penicillin by Fleming and the unpredicted discoveries in astronomy as 
more powerful telescopes become available. Roberts (1989) has catalogued many important 
discoveries in science where serendipity was involved. But experiments, because of their focused 
design, do not usually produce serendipitous findings. If the development of marketing, like 
other disciplines, rests in part on unanticipated findings, we should ask what methods will 
produce more findings of this sort.  
Surveys 
Unpredicted findings are common in observational studies, surveys and panel research. 
However, observational studies are impractical when the focal behaviour is infrequent and panel 
research is designed to answer specific questions about consumer behaviour that may leave out 
matters of interest to the academic researcher. Surveys are more flexible; they are widely used in 
commercial market research. However, in academic work this method is less common because of 
the correlational nature of findings and the potential for response bias (Preisendörfer and Wolter, 
2014). 
 
Surveys have three important virtues that relate to gathering new ideas. One is that they can 
cover a wide range of situations, variables and sub-groups. Respondents can be interrogated 
about these different conditions and the data classified against them. This means that a single 
large survey can cover much more than the typical single controlled experiment. Second, surveys 
allow us to investigate phenomena that are inaccessible by other methods. Suppose we wish to 
study second-hand markets. These can take a variety of forms such as car boot sales, farmers’ 
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markets, charity shops, eBay, and person-to-person deals. Some observational studies are 
possible in specific settings and Internet records, if available, can also be analysed.  However, if 
the interest is in a more complete understanding of the second-hand market, then the only way to 
study this whole area is by survey. This is especially useful if we are interested in how different 
segments of the population divide their purchase across new and second-hand markets and the 
extent to which online and offline channels are used. By enlarging our knowledge in this way, 
we may gain insights about how second-hand markets are used by sub-groups and the social 
conventions under which they operate. The point here is that the method widens our thinking and 
may give rise to insights that, otherwise, would not occur. After a survey of second-hand 
markets, it is likely that further questions will arise that merit investigation. 
 
A third advantage of surveys is that they provide a substantial quantity of data, which if properly 
collected (see Dillman, Smyth and Christian, 2014; Preisendörfer and Wolter, 2014), can yield 
information useful for developing new marketing theories. All the variables measured in a 
survey, for instance, can be tested for association and unexpected correlations may be revealed. 
Some correlations may be interesting and worth testing in further research. Thus, serendipitous 
findings from surveys make them attractive. To illustrate this point, we give one example from a 
recent study that compared the factors that triggered positive word of mouth (PWOM) about 
durables and those triggering it about services (Lomax and East 2016). It was found that, 
whereas advertising instigated 7 per cent of the PWOM about services, it was responsible for 44 
per cent of the PWOM about durables. The researchers speculated that the tangibility of durables 
made ads about them more mentally accessible and effective, and that there might be heavier 
advertising in the durables sector. These speculations will need to be verified in further research 
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but the finding that a large proportion of PWOM about durables is stimulated by advertising 
means that a substantial part of the sales effect of durables advertising arises via PWOM 
carryover.  Managerially, this suggests that one should pre-test how effective durable ads are in 
inducing this PWOM. Current ad pre-testing procedures offered by market research firms do not 
evaluate this effect. Here, a serendipitous survey finding leads to new thinking about ad testing. 
 
To summarise this section, new ideas in marketing and social science usually rest on a 
substantial amount of data. The two different methods of gathering these data discussed here 
make different contributions. Controlled experiments test predicted relationships and provide 
findings that are strong but contextually limited so that large numbers of experiments are needed 
to establish the mass of data required for generalised findings. Surveys provide weaker findings 
but more of them, and can be used to probe topics that are otherwise inaccessible. The large 
volume of data from surveys make it likely that new facts and unexpected relationships may 
emerge when this method is used, and this may lead to new explanations. In this way, a relatively 
weak method may be crucial to the advance of understanding in our field. 
 
Big data 
The ability to spot patterns in large datasets is increasingly important and this type of data 
science is beginning to transform industries (Gutierrez, 2014).  In recent years, a combination of 
three conditions has begun to revolutionise technology and, potentially, the way in which science 
is conducted. First, artificial intelligence has shifted from attempting to analyse data according to 
algorithms based on specific problems and has moved to general problem-solving programs. 
Second, substantial databases have been generated which allow computers using these general 
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problem-solving programs to be trained. Third, the speed and power of computers has risen 
enormously so that massive amounts of processing can be done by programs using such 
databases. The result is seen in fields such as machine translation and pattern recognition which 
get better and better. In the case of games, such as Go, datasets are not needed because the 
computer can play the game millions of times and store successful plays (Guardian, 19th 
October, 2017 “Game over: AI becomes world’s best Go player in just three days”). The 
generality of the problem-solving process means that any databases can be examined and 
searched for relationships. This brute empiricism raises the possibility that the “data first” model 
of research will become more entrenched and will drive new discoveries. At the same time, the 
autonomy of the problem-solving procedures, and their relative inaccessibility, mean that no 
specific explanation of discovered relationships is presented. This raises problems for scientists – 
they will have findings but few leads on what produces these findings. 
  
One further example 
We conclude with an example – how Darwin developed the theory of evolution. Although this is 
not an example in marketing it demonstrates one important point in our argument: the 
accumulation of large amount of evidence can lead to a highly useful theory; in this case, a 
theory that is so revolutionary, it forever changed our view of humanity.   
 
The theory of evolution had its genesis when Darwin, on the 27th December of 1831, set sail on 
the HMS Beagle for a 5-year exploratory voyage around the world. The naval vessel surveyed 
the coast of South America, sailed the world, visiting both Australia and New Zealand, before 
returning to England. This voyage is quite extraordinary because such expeditions are rare, often 
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hazardous, and in this case, of long duration and expensive. Darwin had only just graduated from 
Cambridge University with an Arts degree and was intending to become a clergyman. As an 
unpaid naturalist on the naval ship, his task was to study and collect worthwhile specimens for 
the museums back in England. On this task, Darwin was industrious. Specimens collected 
included rocks, animals preserved in spirits, plants and beetles, fossils of extinct animals, jaws 
and heads of animals, teeth of rodents, marine shells, snakes, toads, lizards, mice, animal skins, 
crustaceans, fish, seeds, animals, geological specimens, birds, tortoises, turtles, iguanas and 
corals. All specimens were meticulously numbered and described.   
 
Although Darwin was not a formally qualified biologist, he was well trained in empirical 
research, and was enthusiastic about natural history. As HMS Beagle traversed the globe, Darwin 
had many opportunities to disembark, explore, observe, catalogue and reflect on how animals 
and plants survived in different terrains. Sometimes, what he saw both fascinated and shocked 
him.  For instance, he was fascinated by cuttlefish being able to change colour and by the 
diversity of birds and reptiles flourishing on the Galapogos Islands. He observed that different 
species of finch live in each island, with each species possessing different types of beak 
depending on the kind of food they eat. Finches that lived in a habitat with a plentiful supply of 
nuts tended to have large strong beaks, while finches that fed on insects had small beaks to catch 
their prey. Another fact that puzzled Darwin was the number of large-animal fossils. Large 
animals need huge amounts of food and yet, curiously, the fossils of these animals were found 
where vegetation was sparse. Darwin theorised that, in the past, the plains on which the animals 
roamed must have been full of vegetation which, over time, had become sparse, leading to the 
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extinction of the animal. These observations helped Darwin formulate his theory of evolution 
based on natural selection but this took a long time to emerge. 
 
After the Beagle returned in 1836, Darwin began to work on his theory. The idea of evolution 
was not all together new at that time since the notion of “species transmutation” has long been 
debated, even before Darwin was born, and there were other theories of evolution postulated 
(e.g., the Larmarckian model). However, what is new was Darwin’s idea of natural selection as 
the mechanism driving evolution at the population level. This did not occur to him immediately 
though. Although Darwin was aware that selective breeding of animals and plants can result in 
physical changes, he did not know how this would occur naturally, a conceptual impasse that he 
needed to overcome. His breakthrough came after reading Malthus' Essay on Population (1798) 
where it was argued that the rapid rise of the human population would threaten its existence 
through competition for resources. It gave Darwin the idea that the weak would die while those 
with favourable traits would survive. Those that survived then produced more progeny with these 
adaptive traits and evolve into a new species. This theory accounts for the great diversity of 
species around the world. Darwin would not have reached this understanding without first 
studying and sorting through his collections, including the fossils. It gave him an understanding 
of how plants and animals came to be distributed by adaptation to the environment, and that a 
failure to adapt would lead to extinction (Ghiselin, 1972).   
 
In the summer of 1842, Darwin wrote a 35-page sketch of his theory based on the mechanism of 
natural selection.  This mechanism can never be directly observed (unlike experiments). But 
Darwin could defend his theory by pointing to many verifying facts, strongly supported by many 
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well-documented observations and specimens including fossils. Other scientists like Gould, the 
famous British ornithologist, independently verified that the finches Darwin collected were 
indeed different species. But more importantly, Darwin could collect all the evidence and present 
it in a systematic manner under one unifying hypothesis – his vera causa. This means either the 
theory of evolution had to be accepted or the facts explained in another way. But Darwin had 
assembled so many facts that his theory could not easily be dismissed (Ruse, 2014).     
 
Although the theory of evolution is now widely accepted, it is easy to forget the difficulties 
Darwin faced in developing his theory and getting it accepted. At that time, very little was 
known about how living organisms flourished in other parts of the world or the terrain they   
inhabited. Furthermore, there was also no unifying theory that made sense of how a species 
originated and developed. The dominant theory on the origin of life at that time was that a 
species was stable and never changed and this made the evolutionary theory radical. The theory 
was also heretical because it contradicted the book of Genesis. For fear of a religious backlash, 
Darwin was reticent about publishing his theory. It was only in 1859, some twenty years after he 
formulated his theory, that On the Origins of Species by Means of Natural Selection (Darwin, 
1859) was published. The theory has predicted many subsequent findings in palaeontology, 
geology, genetics and developmental biology. Like many scientific theories, it was controversial 
when it was first formulated but fully vindicated in the end.   
 
This diversion into the story of evolution is a gentle reminder that harnessing a large amount of 
evidence should be something all scholars must aspire to achieve.  We may not be able to find a 
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vera causa of the stature of Darwin’s but it is relatively easy to collect data in our field.  At least 
our subjects can communicate with us!  
 
Conclusion 
This paper draws attention to the challenges our discipline faces in generating new ideas by 
insight and recognition. New ideas are stimulated by unexpected findings. Thus, we should be 
more positive about methods that produce substantial amounts of data from which connections, 
contradictions and novelties may emerge and oblige new thinking. Surveys, when well executed, 
are well placed to achieve this. Experiments, particularly controlled experiments, are more 
limited in this regard.  This means that the examination of large data sets and the crafting of 
quality surveys should be part and parcel of doctoral training.   We hope our contribution will 
stimulate debate in the community.     
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